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financial status. Some courts allow such evidence,'26 others refuse it.27 Whenever such
evidence is admitted, it is not for the purpose of enhancing the compensation beyond
28
a reasonable amount, but to ascertain the ability of the client to pay even that sum.
Where the client cannot earn more than ordinary wages the charge should be small as
compared to the usual fee.'9 Obviously there is often a close.relation between the result of the suit and the client's wealth. Even though the result be favorable to the
client, it may mean merely relief from a liability, instead of the acquisition of money
damages, in which case he is less inclined to pay a large attorney's fee and often less
able.
No one of the elements which go to make up a reasonable fee is controlling. All of
these factors are to be regarded and each is given such weight as the trier of fact
thinks appropriate in the particular case under consideration.3o Viewing the fee
awarded in the instant case in the light of these criteria the decision seems correct.
Banks and Banking-Contracts-Unenforceability of Agreement by Bank To
Repurchase Securities Sold-[New York].-The defendant bank, through its vicepresident, orally agreed to repurchase at the original sale price, various securities of
other corporations sold to the plaintiff by the bank, upon demand by the purchaser at
any time during the lifetime of the securities. In an action to recover damages for
breach of this contract, held, for defendant; the repurchase agreement was unenforceable because contrary to public policy. Rothschild v. Manufacturers Trust Co.'
This decision, one of first instance in New York, exemplifies the recent tendency
further to restrict operations of banks which might endanger their stability, 2 and illustrates that the business dealings of banks, being more affected with the public interest than the transactions of other corporations3 may be more readily declared void
because contrary to public policy.4
26 Walker v. Hill, 90 Mont. iii, 300 Pac. 26o (1931); French v. Abbott Publishing Co.,
223 App. Div., 276, 228 N.Y. Supp. 62 (1929).
27Winslow v. Atz, x68 Md. 230, 177 At!. 272 (1935); Nelson v. Auch, 62 N.D. 594, 245 N.W.
81g (1932).
28 Baruch v. Giblin, 122 Fla. 59, 164 So. 831 (x935); Stevens v. Ellsworth, 95 Iowa 231,

63 N.W. 683 (x895); Ward v. Cohn, 58 Fed. 462 (C.C.A. 8th 1893).
29People v. Pio, 308 Ill. 128, 139 N.E. 45 (1923).
--Platt v. Shields, 96 Vt. 257, ri9 Atl. 520 (1923).
279 N.Y. 355, i8 N.E. (2d) 527 (1039).
2 See I Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 749 (i934) for the suggestion that the Federal Securities Act, 48
Stat. 74 (1933), the National Banking Act, 48 Stat. 184 (1933), and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. Act, 48 Stat. 168 (1933), indicate a growing public policy that security selling
should be divorced from the banking business.
3 Gause v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 196 N.Y. 134, 153, 89 N.E. 476, 482 (I9o9).
4 Banks have no general power to purchase their own stock, for example, i Zollman, Banks
and Banking § 251 (1936); and cannot obligate themselves to do so, Broderick v. Adamson, 265
N.Y. Supp. 8o4, 148 Misc. 353 (i933). Where a bank brings suit on a promissory note the
defendant may not plead an agreement by the bank not to enforce the instrument, because he
is charged with knowledge that the note might be used to conceal the actual transaction,
Mount Vernon Trust Co. v. Bergoff, 272 N.Y. 192, 5 N.E. (2d) x96 (1936). An assumption
clause in a deed conveying property to a state bank obligating the bank to pay the mortgage
"
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Agreements of banks to repurchase securities sold,s upon demand of the purchaser,
have been widely upheld, 6 but several jurisdictions have recently denied their validity,7
following the lead of the Minnesota court in holding similar agreements which create a
large contingent liability in the bank contrary to public policy.8 Some courts have
held such contracts to be ultra vires, without declaring them contrary to public
policy,9 because they felt bound by the estoppel doctrine which denies the bank the
privilege of setting up the invalidity of the contract as a defense in a suit by a purchaser who had bought securities in reliance on the bank's agreement.An agreement by a bank to repurchase securities sold is said to be contrary to
public policy because it in effect perpetrates a fraud upon the depositors and other
creditors of the bank. It creates a liability contingent upon circumstances over which
the bank has little control, without creating a reciprocal asset, since the bank usually
does not have the option to repurchase at the sales price if the securities should rise in
value. The books of the bank will show that certain securities have been converted
into cash or other liquid assets, without revealing the extent of this contingent liability
which is never measurable in advance. An apparently "safe" bank, having a large
indebtedness is dtra vires, and unenforceable, Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v. Lakeland Star
Tel. Co., iii Fla. 416, I49 So. 597 (i933); contra: Sheley v. Engle, 204 Iowa 1283, 213 N.W.
617 (1927). But a trust company is not to be considered a bank, Meyers v. Heitman Trust Co.,
289 II. App. 619, 7 N.E. (2d) 509 (1937) (trust company held liable on a repurchase
agreement although a bank would not have been).
5This note treats only the situation where a bank has agreed to repurchase securities other
than its own stock. For a collection of cases holding that a bank cannot purchase its own stock
see i Zolman, op. cit. sz pra note 4, at § 251. See 3 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 665 (1936) on agreements by corporations in general to repurchase their own stock.
6 Farmer's State Bank v. Coutoure, 45 N.D. 4or, 178 N.W. 138 (1920); Jenkins v. Nicolas,
63 Utah 329, 226 Pac. 177 (1924); Slaton State Bank v. Amarillo Nat'l Bank, 288 S.W. 639
(Tex. Civ. App. 1926); Merchant's Bank v. Hanna, 73 F. (2d) 88 (C.C.A. 8th 1934); Enid
Bank and Trust Co. v. Yandell, 178 Okla. 550, 56 P. (2d) 835 (1936).
7Hawkins Realty Co. v. Hawkins State Bank, 205 Wis. 4o6, 236 N.W. 657 (931); Knass v.
Madison & Kedzie State Bank, 354 Ill.
554, i88 N.E. 836 (i934); German Baptist Orphan
Home v. Union Banking Co., 13 F. Supp. 814 (Mich. 1935); Brown v. Union Banking
Co., 274 Mich. 499, 265 N.W. 447 (1936). Cf. Awotin v. Atlas Exchange Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 295 U.S. 209 (I935) (federal statute which limits national bank's buying and selling of
investment securities to buying and selling "without recourse" held applicable to repurchase
agreements as well as indorsements and guaranties of investment securities).
8
Farmers and-Mechanics Savings Bank v. Crookston State Bank, 169 Minn. 249, 210 N.W.
998 (1926) (bank cannot contract to retake loans which it has negotiated for a commission);
Greene v. First Nat'l Bank, 172 Minn.310, 215 N.W. 213 (X927) (national bank cannot make
valid real estate mortgage repurchase agreement); Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Crookston
Trust Co., i8o Minn.,319, 230 N.W. 797 (1930) (Minnesota trust companies have no power to
guarantee paper in which they have no beneficial interest).
9 England v. Commercial Bank, 242 Fed. 813 (C.C.A. 8th 1917); First State Bank of Odessa
v. First State Bank of Correll, x65 Minn. 285, 2o6 N.W. 459 (1925); Docking v. Rife, 129 Kan.
812, 284 Pac. 391 (1930).

"0In Westchester Trust Co. v. Harrison, 249 App. Div. 828, 292 N.Y. Supp. 209 (937) it
was expressly stated that although the bank was estopped from pleading that the repurchase
agreement was ultravires, it could successfully plead public policy.
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number of these agreements, could become insolvent in a very short time, as the purchasers would enforce their contracts almost simultaneously if the securities market
became seriously affected by adverse business conditions.
The only justification for repurchase agreements is that they may aid the bank in
making advantageous sales, like the "money back guarantee" or "thirty day free
trial" special inducements to buy.,x If agreements to repurchase were limited to a
reasonably short term they might not be objectionable,12 but a person cannot "try
out" a mortgage bond. If the agreement is to be of value to him he must have the
privilege of exercising his option whenever he sees the market price for his securities
falling, usually during a business depression which is the worst possible time for a
bank to invest in securities at a loss.
Any analogy between repurchase agreements and guaranteeing indorsements in
the sale of bills and notes13 is incomplete, as is pointed out in the instant opinion, because endorsements on negotiable instruments have become common business practice, like selling real estate by deed of general warranty, and are necessary to make
ordinary sales, whereas repurchase agreements are used only as added inducements in
exceptional cases. Furthermore, under an endorsement, liability arises only upon default by the debtor and is primarily a function of his financial stability, which the
bank has passed upon before making the guaranties; but in agreements to repurchase,
the loss suffered by the bank depends not so directly upon the solvency of the debtor
as upon general market conditions and the determination of the purchaser to exercise
his option.
Contracts-Agreements Preliminary to a More Formal Writing-[Washington].The defendant had made previous contracts to sell strawberries to the plaintiff
through the defendant's broker, which had always culminated in written formal
agreements. After negotiations, the defendant made an offer to sell, which was accepted orally by the plaintiff, whereupon the broker mailed a sales memorandum to
both parties referring to a preceding year's contract for minor details, which specified
"This memo becomes void when sale is covered by contract." A formal contract, "not
to be binding until signed by both parties," containing only those terms specified or
referred to in the sales memorandum, was drawn up by the defendant and mailed to
the plaintiff. This formal contract was never executed, the defendant repudiating the
contract before the signature of either party was attached thereto. The court held,
that the sales memorandum was not a contract since both parties contemplated a
formal agreement. PacificFood Products Co. v. Mukai.'
11Cf. Went v. Duluth Coffee and Spice Co., 64 Minn. 307, 67 N.W. 70 (1896) (agreement
by a corporation to repurchase its own stock at purchaser's option held "merely a conditional
sale with option to revoke or rescind in the purchaser," so that it did not amount to an agreement by the corporation to purchase its own stock within the statute controlling such purchases); Ophir Consol. Mines Co. v. Brynteson, 143 Fed. 829 (C.C.A. 7 th 19o6) (agreement
by a corporation to repurchase shares of its own stock if the buyer was not satisfied held valid
as a "sale or return" contract).
"1But see People ex rel. Barrett v. First State Bank and Trust Co., 364 111. 294,4 N.E. (2d)
385 (1936) for a holding that setting a definite time limit would not make a repurchase agreement enforceable.
13See Farmer's State Bank v. Couture, 45 N.D. 4oi, 178 N.W. 138 (1920).
'84 P. (2d) 131 (Wash. 1938).

